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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-REMOVAL JqRISDICTION-MEANING OF "SEPARA'l'B
AND INDEPENDENT'' AS UsED IN THE UNITBD STATES JumCIAL Con:s-The respondent suffered a loss by fire, and being uncertain as to which party was liable
to compensate for this loss, joined the petitioner and two others as defendants in
a suit asking for alternative relief. The petitioner and one of the defendants
were insurance corporations with residence outside the state, while the third
defendant's residence was the same as that of the respondent. The corporate
defendants secured removal of the case to the federal court, and on a trial of the
issues, a judgment was rendered for the respondent against the petitioner in the
amount of the insurance claimed plus interest. A motion by the petitioner to
vacate the judgment and remand the case to the state court was denied by the
trial judge, and the court of appeals affirmed.1 On writ of certiorari, held, reversed. The majority held, "that where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for
which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there
is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under 144l(c)." Three

1

American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn, (5th C~. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 845.
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justices dissented2 on the ground that if any error had been committed as to
removal, it was merely an irregularity and the petitioner having had the case
removed was estopped to request a remand to the state court American Fire
and Casualty Company v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951).
The provisions of the United States Judicial Code relating to the removal
of cases from state courts to federal courts were substantially altered by the
revision of 1948.8 Instead of the troublesome language of the old code which
gave rise to the perplexing "separate-separable" controversy,4 the revised code
permits removal, "(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action."5 Although this change
in language appears effectively to have eliminated any dispute about separability of claims or controversies,6 it has in turn presented terms requiring definition by the courts. Lower federal courts, in suits against joint or concurrent
tortfeasors, have uniformly denied removal. 7 The reasoning of the principal
case appears to have approved the action of these courts. Mayfl.ower Industries
11. Thor Corp.,8 recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court,9 should be compared with
the principal case. Plaintiff in that case sued defendant A, a nonresident of the
2 Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion and Justices Black and Minton concurred.
s The best general discussion of the revised Judicial Code is MooRE, CoMMBNTARY
ON nm U.S. JUDICIAL ConB 217 et seq. (1949). See also "Removal of Causes under the
New Judicial Code," 44 ILL. L. RBv. 397 (1949); Wills and Boyer, "Proposed Changes in
Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure," 9 Omo S-r. J. 257 (1948).
4 " • • • when in any suit ••• there shall be a controversy which is wholly between
citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them, then
either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove
said suit••••" 36 Stat. L. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. (1940) §71. Although this provision is now merely a matter of historical importance, it must be understood to appreciate
fully the changes made by the new code. An article dealing with the old practice is one
by Holmes, "The Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept," 12 Miss. L.J. 163
(1939).
5 62 Stat. L. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. (1950) §1441.
6 "The distinctions which have heretofore been made in the case law between separate
and 'separable controversies' and which were held to authorize the right of removal axe
now to be cast into the limbo of rejected and repealed law." Butler Mfg. Co. v. Wallace
and Tieman Sales, (D.C. Mo. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 635 at 637. A 1950 case, Duffy v.
Duffy, (D.C. Iowa 1950) 89 F. Supp. 745 at 747, still talks in terms of finding a "separable controversy ••• from the complaint."
7Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., (5th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 788;
Edwards v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 165; Willoughby v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., (D.C. Okla. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 994. See also, Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., (D.C. Ark. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 235 (charging defendants with conspiracy to have plaintiffs discharged from employment); Highway Ins.
Underwriters v. Nichols, (D.C. Okla. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 527, and Sansom v. New Amsterdam Ins. Co., (D.C. Ala. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 6 Goining insured and insurer as defendants).
8 (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 537. A recent case expressly applying the test of the
Mayflower case is Doran v. Elgin Cooperative Credit Assn., (D.C. Neb. 1950) 95 F. Supp.
455.
9'fhor Corp. v. Mayflower Industries, 341 U.S. 903, 71 S.Ct. 610 (1951).
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state, for damages from an alleged breach of an exclusive distributorship contract. In the same action the plaintiff alleged that the assumption of the distributorship by defendant B, a resident of the state, constituted a conspiracy by
A and B to injure the plaintiff's business and he asked injunctive relief and
damages against both. A successfully secured removal of the case, and after the
trial court denied a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals on appeal held
that there were no separate and independent claims or causes of action and
ordered remand of the case to the state court. 10 The two cases may be distinguished on the ground that the relief sought in the principal case was in the
alternative while the complaint in the Mayfl,ower case asked for relief against
both defendants. However, the similarity of reasoning in both cases demonstrates many common points. Both courts emphasized the presence of the two
adjectives "separate" and "independent," which they did not feel should be
taken as synonymous terms. The use of two adjectives was construed as an
expression of congr~ssional intent that there should be a complete absence of
underlying connection between the claims in order to have removal. Both courts
felt that there could be no absence of underlying connection when the claims
asserted arose out of the same "interlocked series of transactions"11 or "operative
facts." 12 It would appear that whether one claim in the alternative or multiple
claims are presented, the burden will be on the party seeking removal to demonstrate that the claims do not have this common background.13 In imposing
this requirement, it may be that these two cases have effectively eliminated
removal of cases involving in-state and out-of-state defendants to federal courts.
Under the most liberal state statutory provisions for joining defendants it is
necessary to allege claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence in
order to join.14 Therefore, if the plaintiff has met the statutory provisions for
joining defendants, he will have shown that his claims are not separate and
independent.

Paul Harrison, S.Ed.
10 There were three separate opinions rendered by the court. Judge Hastie, in an
opinion concurred in by Judge Goodrich, felt that the claims against both defendants were
but two aspects of the same economic injury. Judge Goodrich gave further grounds for the
court's action. Judge McLaughlin, in a dissenting opinion, felt that there were two distinct
wrongs to the plaintiff in the form of breach of contract and conspiracy. Case authority
may be found to support either side of the proposition that a breach of, and conspiracy to
breach, an exclusive contract constitute two causes of action. Cf. Motley, Green and Co.
v. Detroit Steel and Spring Co;, (C.C. N.Y. 1908) 161 F. 389 (one cause of action); E. L.
Rusting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927) (one cause of action);
Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908) (two causes of action).
11 Principal case at 14.
12 MayHower Industries v. Thor Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 537 at 539.
13 Compare Commander-Larabee Milling Co. v. Jones-Hettelsater Const. Co., (D.C.
Mo. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 476, which allowed removal. It is submitted that this case could
not be supported under the test proposed by the principal case.
14 See CLARK, CoDB PLEADING, 2d ed., §19 (1947), where a complete discussion is
made on 'permissive joinder provisions. See also Blume, ''The Scope of a Civil Action," 42
MrcH. L. REv. 257 at 264 (1943).

